Abstract-It is known that the set of all correlated equilibria of an n-player cooperative game is a convex polytope and includes all the Nash equilibria. Further, the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of this polytope. We study the geometry of both these equilibrium notions when the players have cumulative prospect theoretic (CPT) preferences. The set of CPT correlated equilibria includes all the CPT Nash equilibria but it need not be a convex polytope. We show that it can, in fact, be disconnected. However, all the CPT Nash equilibria continue to lie on its boundary. We also characterize the sets of CPT correlated equilibria and CPT Nash equilibria for all 2 × 2 games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competitive game theory studies the interaction between decision makers with possibly different objectives. In most cases, it is assumed that the decision makers are rational. Rationality is generally formulated as expected utility maximization. The justification for this comes from the von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility maximization theorem [1] . Although this assumption has a nice normative appeal to it and can be used to a large extent as a prescriptive theory, it has been evident through several examples [2] , [3] , [4] that the model is not that good an approximation for descriptive purposes. On the other hand, cumulative prospect theory (CPT) accommodates many empirically observed behavioral features without losing much tractability [5] .
Two of the most well known notions of equilibrium, Nash equilibrium [6] and correlated equilibrium [7] , are based on expected utility theory (EUT). Keskin [8] defines an analog for both these equilibrium notions based on cumulative prospect theory. He also establishes the existence of such equilibria under certain continuity conditions.
There has been considerable interest in the study of the comparative geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria. Under EUT, it is known that the set of all correlated equilibria is a convex polytope and contains the set of all Nash equilibria. In [9] , it has been proved that the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the correlated equilibrium polytope.
(P)
Further, it has been found that in 2-player (bimatrix) games, all extremal Nash equilibria are also extremal correlated soham phade@berkeley.edu, ananth@eecs.berkeley.edu equilibria [10] , [11] , [12] , although this result does not hold for more than 2 players [9] . The sets of correlated and Nash equilibria have been completely characterized for 2×2 games [13] .
Cumulative prospect theory is known to share common features with expected utility theory. The purpose of this paper is to study how the geometry of equilibrium notions is affected by prospect theoretic preferences. For example, under CPT, it continues to be the case that the set of correlated equilibria contains all Nash equilibria, but the set of correlated equilibria is not guaranteed to be a convex polytope [8, Example 2] . The pure Nash equilibria, if they exist, coincide under EUT and CPT [8, Proposition 2] . It is known that the set of correlated equilibria under CPT includes the set of joint probability distributions induced by the convex hull of the set of pure Nash equilibria [8, Proposition 3] , as is true under EUT.
These similarities and differences raise the question of whether property (P) continues to hold or not under CPT. We will see that the set of correlated equilibria can be disconnected (section IV). Nevertheless, our main result says that property (P) continues to hold under CPT (section II). We also show that for 2×2 games the set of correlated equilibria under CPT is a convex polytope, and we characterize it (section III).
II. PRELIMINARIES AND MAIN RESULT
Let Γ = (N, (S i ) i∈N , (h i ) i∈N ) be a finite n-person normal form game, where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, S i is the finite strategy set of player i ∈ N and h i : S 1 × · · · × S n → R is the payoff function for player i ∈ N . Let each player i ∈ N have at least two strategies, i.e |S i | ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ N . Let the set of all joint strategies be denoted by S = i∈N S i . Let s i ∈ S i denote a pure strategy of player i ∈ N and let s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S denote a joint strategy of all players. Let S −i = j∈N \i S j denote the set of joint strategies s −i ∈ S −i of all players except player i. Let h i (s) denote the payoff of player i when joint strategy s is played, and let h i (d i , s −i ) denote the payoff of player i when she chooses strategy d i ∈ S i while the others adhere to s.
for some player i ∈ N , some s ∈ S, and some
Consider a joint probability distribution μ on S viewed as a vector in R |S| with coordinates μ(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S,
with the usual topology. Definition 2 (Aumann [14] ). A joint probability distribution μ ∈ Δ |S|−1 is said to be a correlated equilibrium of Γ if it satisfies the following inequalities:
(1) The set of all correlated equilibria, denoted as C EUT , is a convex polytope which is a proper subset of Δ |S|−1 iff the game is non-trivial. The set I of all joint probability distributions that are of product form is defined by a system of nonlinear constraints, viz.
where μ i denotes the marginal probability distribution on S i induced by μ. The set of all Nash equilibria is the intersection of I and C EUT . By Nash's existence theorem, it is nonempty. We now give a quick review of cumulative prospect theory (CPT). (For more details see [15] .) Each person is associated with a reference point r ∈ R, a corresponding value function v r : R → R, and two probability weighting functions w ± :
+ for gains and w − for losses. The function v r (x) satisfies: (i) it is continuous in x and r; (ii) v r (r) = 0; (iii) it is strictly increasing in x. The value function is generally assumed to be convex in the losses frame (x < r) and concave in the gains frame (x > r), and is steeper in the losses frame than in the gains frame in the sense that v 
where z j ∈ R, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, denotes an outcome and p j , 1 ≤ j ≤ t, is the probability with which outcome z j occurs. We assume the outcomes to be exhaustive, i.e. Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a t ) be a permutation of (1, . . . , t) such that
Let 0 ≤ j r ≤ t be such that z aj ≥ r for 1 ≤ j ≤ j r and z aj < r for j r < j ≤ t. (Here j r = 0 when z aj < r for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t.) The CPT value V r (L) of the prospect L is evaluated using the value function v r (·) and the probability weighting functions w ± (·) as follows:
where π
Although the expression on the right in equation (3) depends on the permutation a, one can check that the formula evaluates to the same value V r (L) as long as the permutation a satisfies (2) . The CPT value in equation (3) can equivalently be written as:
A person is said to have CPT preferences if, given a choice between prospect L 1 and prospect L 2 , she chooses the one with higher CP T value.
CPT satisfies strict stochastic dominance [16] : shifting positive probability mass from an outcome to a strictly preferred outcome leads to a strictly preferred prospect. (4)). Also, CPT satisfies strict monotonicity [16] : any prospect becomes strictly better as soon as one of its outcomes is strictly improved. For example, if (3)). We now describe the notion of correlated equilibrium incorporating CPT preferences, as defined by Keskin [8] . Let {v r i (·), r ∈ R} be a family of value functions, one for each reference point, and w ± i (·) be the probability weighting functions for each player i ∈ N . For every player i ∈ N , let the reference point be determined by a continuous function
denote the CPT value of a lottery L evaluated by player i, using the value function v r i (·) and probability weighting functions w
be the marginal distribution of player i, and for s i such that
be the conditional distribution on S −i . If player i observes a signal to play s i drawn from the joint distribution μ, and if she decides to deviate to a strategy d i ∈ S i , then she will face the lottery
Definition 3. A joint probability distribution μ ∈ Δ |S|−1 is said to be a CPT correlated equilibrium of Γ if it satisfies the following inequalities for all i and for all
For any fixed reference point r, since the value function v r (·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, one can check that two prospects (p, x) and (p, y) have equal CPT value under all probability distributions p iff x = y. It then follows that the set C CP T is a proper subset of Δ |S|−1 iff the game is non-trivial.
The set of all CPT correlated equilibria, henceforth denoted by C CP T , is no longer guaranteed to be a convex polytope [8, Example 2] . The set of all CPT Nash equilibria, as defined 1 by Keskin, is the intersection of I and C CP T [8, Proposition 1]), and is non-empty [8, Theorem 1] . We are interested in studying the geometry of this intersection. It should be noted that the set C CP T depends on the choice of the reference functions r i (μ), as does the set of CPT Nash equilibria.
In the case of traditional utility-theoretic equilibria, it has been proved that:
Proposition 4 ([9]). In any finite, non-trivial game, the Nash equilibria are on the boundary of the polytope of correlated equilibria when it is viewed as a subset of the smallest affine space containing all joint probability distributions.
Since the set of correlated equilibria C EUT is a convex polytope, it is enough to prove that the Nash equilibria lie on one of the faces of C EUT if C EUT is full-dimensional, i.e. has dimension |S| − 1, when it is viewed as a subset of the affine space containing Δ |S|−1 , and the statement is trivially true if it is not full-dimensional. When the set C EUT is not full-dimensional, it is possible for the Nash equilibria to lie in the relative interior of the set C EUT [9, Proposition 2].
We will now extend the above proposition for equilibria with CPT preferences. The proof is quite different, since in general C CP T is not a convex polytope, as shown in Example 11 in Section IV below (see also [8, Example 2] ). We omit the proof. Full details will be in a forthcoming ArXiv document.
Proposition 5. In any finite, non-trivial game, the CPT Nash equilibria are on the boundary of the set of CPT correlated equilibria when it is viewed as a subset of the smallest affine space containing all joint probability distributions.
The proof is based on the following lemma which in itself is an interesting property of cumulative prospect theoretic preferences. Let V r (·) denote the CPT value evaluated with respect to a value function v r (·) and probability weighting functions w ± (·) with respect to a reference point r ∈ R. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ) be two outcome profiles and p = (p 1 , . . . , p t ) be a probability distribution. The prospect (p, x) is said to pointwise dominate the prospect (p, y) if x j ≥ y j for all j such that p j > 0. Further, if the inequality x j ≥ y j holds strictly for at least one j with p j > 0 then the prospect (p, x) is said to strictly pointwise dominate the prospect (p, y). Let the regret corresponding to choosing y instead of x be denoted by
Prospects (p, x) and (p, y) are said to be similarly ranked if there exists a permutation (a 1 , . . . , a t ) of T := {j ∈ {1, . . . , t}|p j > 0} such that 
for all r ∈ R, for all > 0 such that p + δ ∈ Δ t−1 .
Proof. We observe that it is enough to prove the claim for the case when p j > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t because, if not, then we can let x , y and p be respectively the vectors x, y and p restricted to the coordinates in T and then use the result. WLOG let the ordering be such that
Suppose (i) holds. Then there exist j 1 < j 2 (and hence x j1 ≥ x j2 ) such that y j1 < y j2 . Now, by the strict stochastic dominance property of CPT, we have
and hence (7) follows. Now suppose (p, x) and (p, y) are similarly ranked. WLOG let the ordering be such that x 1 ≥ · · · ≥ x t and y 1 ≥ · · · ≥ y t . Suppose (ii) holds. Then there exist j 1 , j 2 such that x j1 > y j1 and x j2 < y j2 . In fact, one can find j 1 , j 2 such that x j1 > y j1 , x j = y j for all j between j 1 and j 2 and x j2 < y j2 . Depending on the order of j 1 and j 2 we have the following two cases (note j 1 = j 2 ): Case 1 (j 1 < j 2 ): Then we have the ordering x j2 < y j2 ≤ y j1 < x j1 . Let δ = δ(j 1 , j 2 ). Then it follows from the strict monotonicity of the functions w ± i (·) and the definition of decision weights that
(
. The other subcases can be handled similarly. Case 2 (j 1 > j 2 ): this implies that y j1 < x j1 ≤ x j2 < y j2 . Taking δ = δ(j 2 , j 1 ), each of the subcases depending on the position of the reference point can be handled as in case 1.
Full details will be in a forthcoming ArXiv document.
Remark 7. The vector δ used in the proof above depends only on the prospects (p, x) and (p, y) and not on the reference point r. In fact, it depends only on the order structure of the vectors x and y and not on the probability distribution vector p, as long as p j > 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Also, the range of for which the claim holds depends only on the prospects (p, x) and (p, y) and not on the reference point r. Lemma 6 can be extended to more general CPT settings as in [16] , where the outcome space is assumed to be a connected topological space instead of monetary outcomes in R.
III. 2 × 2 GAMES
For a game Γ, the set C CP T , in general, need not be convex (example 2 in [8] ). In this section we will see that, in the special case of a 2×2 game with players having a fixed reference point independent of the underlying probability distribution, C CP T is a convex polytope.
Consider a 2 player game Γ with N = {1, 2} and S 1 = S 2 = {0, 1}. With player 1 as the row player and player 2 as the column player, and {a ij , b ij } i,j∈{0,1} representing payoffs for player 1 and 2 respectively, let the payoff matrix be as shown in figure 1 . Let μ = {μ 00 , μ 01 , μ 10 , μ 11 } ∈ Δ 3 be a joint probability distribution assigning probabilities to joint strategies as represented by the matrix in figure 1. Let r 1 and r 2 be fixed reference points (independent of the joint probability distribution μ) for players 1 and 2 respectively. Proof. The condition for μ ∈ C CP T corresponding to the row player deviating from strategy 0 to strategy 1 in (5) is:
where
μ00+μ01 , x = (a 00 , a 01 ), y = (a 10 , a 11 ). Let C 1 denote the set of all μ ∈ Δ 3 satisfying condition (8). We have:
(i) if a 00 ≥ a 10 and a 01 ≥ a 11 , then C 1 = Δ 3 ; (ii) if a 00 < a 10 and a 01 = a 11 (resp. a 00 = a 10 and a 01 < a 11 ), then C 1 = {μ ∈ Δ 3 |μ 00 = 0} (resp. C 1 = {μ ∈ Δ 3 |μ 01 = 0}); (iii) If a 00 < a 10 and a 01 < a 11 , then C 1 = {μ ∈ Δ 3 |μ 00 = 0, μ 01 = 0}; (iv) if a 00 < a 10 and a 01 > a 11 (resp. a 00 > a 10 and a 01 < a 11 ), then, from lemma 6, R 
and hence the inequality in condition (8) holds iff p 1 0 ≤ q 0 (resp. p 1 1 ≤ q 1 ) for a certain q 0 ∈ (0, 1) (resp. q 1 ∈ (0, 1)) depending on the payoffs a 00 , a 01 , a 10 and a 11 , the value function v r 1 (·), and the probability weight functions w
In each case, C 1 is a convex polytope. Similarly, the other three conditions in (5), corresponding to the row player deviating from strategy 1 to strategy 0, the column player deviating from strategy 0 to strategy 1, and the column player deviating from strategy 1 to strategy 0, give rise to convex polytopes C 2 , C 3 , and C 4 respectively. The set C CP T is the (non-empty) intersection of these convex polytopes and hence is itself a convex polytope. • Strategy s i is said to be strictly dominated by strategy d i if, for every strategy profile of the opponents, choosing d i is better than choosing s i . The interpretation of these concepts in terms of the payoffs of an individual player turn out to be identical in the CPT case as in the EUT. This requires an argument, because the way CPT value is computed in terms of the payoffs is quite different. The details will be in a forthcoming ArXiv document. Note that a strictly dominated strategy is also a weakly dominated strategy.
We now look at the convex polytope C CP T for a 2 × 2 game in more detail. We first discuss 2 × 2 games with no equivalent or weakly dominated strategies. Thus the relation amongst the payoffs for all the four conditions corresponding to C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , and C 4 are as in case (iv) above. Further, the conditions corresponding to the row player deviating from strategy 0 to strategy 1 and vice versa are
and
respectively, where p 1 is as in proposition 8 and 
A similar argument works for player 2. Thus, depending on the relation amongst the payoffs, the conditions (5) for some α, β > 0. Thus every 2×2 game with no equivalent or weakly dominated strategies can be classified into one of the above four types depending on the relations amongst its payoffs. We consider the canonical 2 × 2 games γ l (α, β) for l ∈ {I, II, III, IV } with α, β > 0 as shown in figure 2 . One can check that the set C EUT for each of these games is given by the corresponding inequalities above.
As in [13] , based on the type of inequalities satisfied, we classify all 2 × 2 games, with no equivalent or weakly dominated strategies, into three types:
• coordination games if the inequalities take form (I), Thus all inequalities must be satisfied with equality and we get
,
Case (III) is similar. Thus, for competitive games, the set C EUT is reduced to a single point, which is also the unique mixed Nash equilibrium. For coordination games, the set C EUT is a convex polytope with five vertices [13] (figure 3). It intersects the set I at the three vertices μ * A (α, β), μ * B (α, β) and μ * C (α, β) of which the first two are pure Nash equilibria. From the set of inequalities corresponding to cases (I) and (IV) we can see that the joint distribution μ = (μ 00 , μ 01 , μ 10 , μ 11 ) belongs to C EUT of γ I (α, β) iff τ (μ) := (μ 10 , μ 11 , μ 00 , μ 01 ) belongs to C EUT of γ IV (α, 1/β) [13] . Thus, for anti-coordination games, the set C EUT is again a convex polytope with five vertices, and it intersects I at three of its vertices, with two of them pure Nash equilibria. The vertices can be found from figure 3, using the transformation τ , and replacing β by 1/β. Since C CP T is determined by the same set of inequalities in α and β, all the results carry over to 2 × 2 games with CPT preferences.
Consider now a 2 × 2 game with at least one strictly dominated strategy (say player 1 has a strictly dominated strategy). This corresponds to case (i) above with both inequalities strict (i.e. a 00 > a 10 and a 01 > a 11 ) or case (iii). Strictly dominated strategies cannot be used with positive probability in any correlated equilibrium of that game. It is easy then to compute the set C CP T for such a game by eliminating the strictly dominated strategies. The set C CP T is either a point or a line segment contained in I. Fig. 3 : Vertices of the convex polytope C EUT for γ I (α, β) Consider now a 2 × 2 game with at least one weakly dominated strategy but no equivalent or strictly dominated strategy. If player 1 has a weakly dominated strategy then this corresponds to case (i) above with one equality and one strict inequality (i.e. a 00 > a 10 and a 01 = a 11 or a 00 = a 10 and a 01 > a 11 ) or case (ii). These cases, however, can be cast in the form of an inequality as in case (iv), with α = 0 or ∞. For example, if a 00 < a 10 and a 01 = a 11 , then
with α = ∞. The equation αμ 00 ≤ μ 01 with α = ∞ should be seen as a formal way to represent μ 00 ≤ α −1 μ 01 where α −1 = 0. Note that we also have
with α = ∞. Thus, for games with weakly dominated strategies but no strictly dominated strategies, the set C CP T is given by a set of inequalities as in the case of games with neither equivalent nor weakly dominated strategies, now allowing α, β to take values 0 or ∞. The geometry of C CP T in case (I) is as follows: The geometry of C CP T is cases (IV) and (III) can be obtained from cases (I) and (II) respectively, using the transformation τ , and replacing β by 1/β.
We now consider a 2 × 2 game with at least one equivalent pair of strategies but no strictly dominated strategies. Suppose player 1 has equivalent strategies. This corresponds to case (i) above with both equalities (i.e. a 00 = a 10 and a 01 = a 10 ). Thus player 1 is indifferent between his strategies. For player 2, if the two strategies are equivalent, then the game is trivial and C CP T = Δ 3 . If one of the strategies is weakly dominated, then C CP T is characterized by the inequalities 
IV. CONNECTEDNESS OF C CP T
In the previous section, we saw that for 2 × 2 games the set C CP T is a convex polytope. However, in general, the set C CP T can have a more complicated geometry. We will now see that the set C CP T can, in fact, be disconnected.
In this section, we restrict our attention to games with each player i having reference point r i = 0, and all the outcomes h i (·) non-negative. Thus all our outcome profiles are "one-sided" with zero reference point, and we will denote w
The geometry of the set C CP T is determined by the set of inequalities (5) . Let us consider the inequality corresponding to player i deviating from strategy s i to d i . For ease of notation, fix a one to one correspondence between the numbers {1, . . . , t} and the joint strategies
t−1 be a joint probability distribution on S −i . Let (a 1 , . . . , a t ) and (b 1 , . . . , b t ) be permutations of (1, . . . , t) such that, respectively,
Consider the inequality
Let C(i, s i , d i ) denote the set of all probability vectors p ∈ Δ t−1 that satisfy the above inequality. We can similarly define
It is clear from the definition of CPT correlated equilibrium that for a joint probability distribution μ ∈ C CP T , provided μ i (s i ) > 0, the probability vector p = μ
Now, for all i, define a subset C(i) ⊂ Δ |S|−1 , as follows:
Note that C(i) is nonempty. The set C(i) can be constructed from the sets {C(i,
|Si|−1 be a probability distribution over S i such that q i (s i ) = 0 for all s i ∈ S i such that C(i, s i ) = 0, and define a joint probability
and for every μ ∈ C(i), the corresponding q i = μ i for all
Thus the set C CP T is uniquely determined by the collection of sets {C(i,
The proof the following lemma will be in a forthcoming ArXiv document.
Even though the sets C(i, s i , d i ) are connected, their intersection might be disconnected, as in the following example.
Example 11. Consider a 2 player game each with three strategies: TOP, CENTER, BOTTOM for player 1 (row player) and RED, YELLOW, GREEN for player 2 (column player), with the corresponding payoffs as shown in figure  4 . For both the players, let v i (·) be the identity function. For the probability weight function w i (·) we employ functions of the form suggested by Prelec [17] . For i = 1, 2, we let Rearranging, we get We cannot yet conclude that the set C(1) is disconnected because of the joint probability distributions μ with marginal distribution μ 1 (TOP) = 0. We now show that C(2) cannot contain any distribution μ with μ 1 (TOP) = 0. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Although the set of correlated equilibria under CPT is more complicated than a convex polytope, property (P), relating the Nash and correlated equilibrium sets, continues to hold. Property (P) is particularly relevant to the interactive learning problem in game theory [18] , [19] , [20] . This suggests studying the interactive learning problem under cumulative prospect theoretic preferences. We leave this for future work.
